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I. INTRODUCTION
The Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) is an international
institution with a North American focus. The CEC was created by the United
States, Canada, and Mexico in the environmental side agreement they negotiated
to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).1 This side agreement -
itself known by the acronym NAAEC - is officially entitled the North American
* Director, Submissions on Enforcement Matters Unit, Commission for Environmental Cooperation. This
article does not represent the views of the CEC but instead solely represents the views of the author. Professor
Markell is currently on leave from his position as a Professor at Albany Law School. He would like to express
his appreciation to Professors Edith Brown Weiss, John Knox, Alastair Lucas, Stephen McCaffrey, Dan Tarlock,
and David Wirth, and to Carla Sbert of the CEC and Steve Charnovitz, for their insightful comments on earlier
versions of this article. Any mistakes are, of course, the sole responsibility of the author. Karen Douglas,
Stanford Law School, Class of 2001, provided invaluable assistance in connection with this article.
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, opened for signature Dec. 8, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M.
296 [hereinafter NAFTA].
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Agreement on Environmental Cooperation.z The NAAEC charges the CEC with
a variety of responsibilities.
This article reviews one of the more innovative features of the CEC, its citizen
submission process.3 It begins by providing a brief overview of the origins,
structure, and responsibilities of the CEC. Second, it describes the citizen
submission process. Third, it provides an update on the current status of the
process. Finally, the article offers a few observations concerning the future
evolution of the process and it identifies several fertile areas for future research.
II. THE ORIGINS, STRUCTURE, AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CEC
The NAAEC went into effect on January 1, 1994. 4 It is one of many
international environmental agreements of relatively recent vintage. Two
2. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M.
1480 [hereinafter NAAEC]. The Agreement, as well as many of the CEC-generated documents referenced in
this article, are available on the CEC homepage, Welcome to the Commission on Environmental Cooperation
(visited Apr. 5, 2000) <http://www.cec.org> [hereinafter CEC homepagel. Because the web site is periodically
reorganized, this article will reference most CEC documents to the CEC homepage rather than to specific
addresses in the web site. For discussions of the NAAEC, see, e.g., PIERRE MARC JOHNSON & ANDRE BEAULIEU,
THE ENVIRONMENT AND NAFTA: UNDERSTANDING AND IMPLEMENTING THE NEW CONTINENTAL LAW (1996);
DAvtD HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 1245 (1998); Beatriz Bugeda, Is
NAFTA Up to its Green Expectations? Effective Law Enforcement Under the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation, 32 U. RICH. L. REv. 1591 (1999); Naomi Gal-Or, Multilateral Trade and
Supranational Environmental Protection: The Grace Period of the CEC, or a Well-Defined Role?, 9 GEO. INT'L
ENvTL. L. REv. 53, 54 (1996); David A. Wirth, International Trade Agreements: Vehicles for Regulatory
Reform?, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 331, 367 n.112 (1997) [hereinafter Wirth 1997]; David A. Wirth, Reexamining
Decision-Making Processes in International Environmental Law, 79 IOWA L. REv. 769, 781 (1994) [hereinafter
Wirth 1994]; Kevin W. Patton, Note, Dispute Resolution Under the North American Commission for
Environmental Cooperation, 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 87, 90-102 (1994).
3. Many commentators have suggested that active citizen participation in environmental protection in the
United States is an important feature of the U.S. domestic system. Citizens have the opportunity to participate
through a variety of mechanisms. These include, inter alia, involvement in rulemaking proceedings under the
Administrative Procedure Act; provision of comments on proposed enforcement settlements; participation in
processes under the federal Superfund law, the National Environmental Policy Act, and the Endangered Species
Act; and involvement in committees created under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). Many federal
environmental statutes give citizens the right to bring federal court actions under various circumstances. See
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv., 120 S. Ct. 693 (2000). See generally David L. Markell, The
Role of Deterrence-Based Enforcement in a "Reinvented" State/Federal Relationship: The Divide Between
Theory and Reality, 24 HARv. ENVTL. L. Rev. 1 (2000); David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental
Federalism: Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal System: Can Three Not Be a Crowd
When Enforcement Authority Is Shared by the United States, the States, and Their Citizens, 54 MD. L. REv.
1552, 1560-61 (1995) (suggesting that "only extensive use of citizen suits ... can safeguard the [U.S.]
enforcement system from collapse .... ").
4. NAAEC, supra note 2. Several commentators have chronicled the negotiations leading to adoption of the
NAAEC. See, e.g., Joseph F. DiMento & Pamela M. Doughman, Soft Teeth in the Back of the Mouth: The
NA FTA Environmental Side Agreement Implemented, 10 GEO. INT'L ENvTL. L. REv. 651 (1998); John Kirton,
The Commission for Environmental Cooperation and Canada-U.S. Environmental Governance in the NAFTA
Era, 27 AM. REv. CAN. STUD. 459 (1997). For a helpful compilation of documents relating to the negotiations as
well as a summary of the discussions, see DANIEL MAGRAW, NAFTA & TmE ENvutoNMENT: SUBSTANCE AND
PROCESS (1995).
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prominent commentators summarize the extraordinary increase in recent years in
the number of international legal instruments involving environmental matters:
At the time of the Stockholm conference [in 1972], there were only a few dozen
multilateral treaties dealing with environmental issues.
By 1992, when countries gathered again to deal with the global environment
at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development at Rio de
Janeiro, there were more than 900 international legal instruments (mostly
binding) that were either fully directed to environmental protection or had more
than one important provision addressing the issue.5
As many commentators have observed, the price of passage of the NAFTA
through the U.S. Congress was the adoption of a companion agreement intended
to prevent the environment from bearing the costs of increased trade among the
three signatory countries.6 This price was demanded even though some have
characterized NAFTA as "more attentive to environmentally-related concerns
"17than are most if not all the preceding trade agreements ....
5. Harold K. Jacobson & Edith Brown Weiss, A Framework for Analysis, in ENGAGING CoUNTRIES:
STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS 1 (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold
K. Jacobson eds., 1998). See also Kal Raustiala, The "Participatory Revolution" in International Environmen-
tal Law, 21 HARv. ENVTL. L. RaV. 537, 537 (1997) (noting that "the last quarter century has witnessed
exponential growth in the number and complexity of multilateral legal instruments aimed at environmental
protection") [hereinafter Raustiala 1997]; Oran R. Young, The Effectiveness of International Environmental
Regimes, 10 INT'L ENVTL. AFF. 267 (1998) (noting that a "striking feature of the recent past is the sharp rise...
in the creation of international regimes as a means of addressing [environmental] problems...").
6. See, e.g., U.S. GAO, North American Free Trade Agreement: Assessment of Major Issues, GAO/GGD-93-
137B, 114 (Sept. 1993) (noting that "[s]everal major environmental groups generally believed.., that NAFTA
was worth supporting, as long as a strong parallel environmental agreement was signed" and continuing that
"[s]ome environmental groups continue to oppose NAFTA, asserting that the recent side agreement is
inadequate"); HUNTER ET AL., supra note 2, at 1245; JOHNSON & BEAULIEU, supra note 3, at 123 (noting that
"[w]ithout a fairly comprehensive framework for environmental cooperation strengthened with enforcement
provisions, many concluded that NAFTA would have no hope for survival in the American ratification process,
given the environmental concerns of the legislators, the organized opposition to NAFTA, and the promises
made by two Presidents"); Kirton, supra note 4, at 464, 480 (stating that the "CEC... [was] the product less of
any fundamental enduring commitment to environmental values on the part of the three governments in North
American than of a temporary need of a Republican, and then Democratic, president to secure sufficient
domestic support to ensure legislative passage of a historic free trade agreement"); Kal Raustiala, International
"Enforcement of Enforcement" Under the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 36 VA. J.
INT'L L. 721, 723-24 (1996) [hereinafter Raustiala 1996] (noting that a "driving factor" for the adoption of the
NAAEC was the "great concern - primarily on the part of U.S. environmental groups - that Mexican
environmental law ... was inadequately implemented and enforced" and continuing that: "In return for their
political support of NAFrA, several major U.S. environmental organizations, joined by similar groups in
Canada and Mexico, demanded the negotiation of a companion agreement creating a North American
Commission on Environmental Cooperation"); Four-Year Review of the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation: Report of the Independent Review, Committee 8 (June 1998), available at CEC
homepage, supra note 2 [hereinafter IRC Report] (noting that "[t]he negotiation of the NAAEC and the creation
of the CEC were U.S. conditions for its adoption of NAFTA, a result of domestic opposition to the trade
agreement alone").
7. JOHNSON & BEAULIEU, supra note 6, at 121. For a more skeptical view of NAFTA, see Steve Charnovitz,
The North American Free Trade Agreement: Green Law or Green Spin?, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1, 68, 76
(1994) [hereinafter Chamovitz NAFTA] (concluding that NAFTA is not a particularly "green" trade agreement
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Despite its origins as something of a palliative to those concerned about the
environmental implications of enhanced trade, the NAAEC's reach extends far
beyond the trade and environment arena. As a result, some observers urge that the
NAAEC is far more than a "side agreement" but instead is a "complete and vital
agreement in its own right.",8 Article 1 of the NAAEC lists a series of ten
objectives for the agreement. Most have little on the surface to do with trade but
instead focus on strengthening domestic environmental regimes. These objec-
tives include, for example, increasing cooperation among the parties "to better
conserve, protect, and enhance the environment," and strengthening cooperation
in developing and improving environmental laws.9
The parties to the NAAEC created the CEC to advance achievement of its
objectives.' The CEC has a tripartite structure. It is governed by a Council,
and indicating that "it is hard to understand how officials in both the Clinton and Bush administrations could
characterize the NAFTA as the greenest trade agreement"). Mr. Charnovitz also notes that "[i]t is also hard to
understand how the press could print such misinformation without any attempts at verification." Charnovitz,
supra, at 76. He continues, "A truly green trade treaty would assure that the newly engendered trade does not
abase the environment or undermine an environmental protection regime. Neither assurance is provided by the
NAFTA." Charnovitz, supra.
See also Raymond MacCallum, Comment, Evaluating the Citizen Submission Procedure Under the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 8 COLO. J. INT'L ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 395, 396-97 (1997)
(stating that "[a]lthough the NAF1TA has been hailed as the 'greenest' trade agreement ever, this claim is largely
based on the fact that sustainable development and environmental protection get a few cursory mentions in the
NAFTA, where such considerations are unprecedented in the history of trade agreements. In reality, it was the
perceived failure of the NAFrA to seriously address the substantial concems of environmentally conscientious
critics that forced the development and adoption of the NAAEC.").
8. See, e.g., IRC Report, supra note 6, at 4-7. "The IRC believes that the long-term value of NAAEC and the
Commission will be measured not so much by a technically defined environment and trade 'rule,' but rather by
the contribution the CEC makes to improved environmental conditions for all people in North America, in the
context of changing economic patterns - in short, by its contribution to sustainable development in North
America." Id. at 5.
9. The objectives of the NAAEC include:
(a) foster the protection and improvement of the environment in the territories of the Parties for the
well-being of present and future generations;
(b) promote sustainable development based on cooperation and mutually supportive environmental
and economic policies;
(c) increase cooperation between the Parties to better conserve, protect, and enhance the environ-
ment, including wild flora and fauna;
(d) support the environmental goals and objectives of the NAFTA;
(e) avoid creating trade distortions or new trade barriers;
(f) strengthen cooperation on the development and improvement of environmental laws, regulations,
procedures, policies and practices;
(g) enhance compliance with, and enforcement of, environmental laws and regulations;
(h) promote transparency and public participation in the development of environmental laws,
regulations and policies;
(i) promote economically efficient and effective environmental measures; and
(j) promote pollution prevention policies and practices.
NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 1. While some of these objectives focus on the relationship between trade and the
environment (e.g., Article 1(b) and (e)), others do not.
10. See NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 8.
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which is comprised of the highest-level environmental officials of each member
country." A permanent staff known as the Secretariat is based in Montreal.'
2
Finally, the Agreement creates a Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAG),
13
comprised of fifteen citizens, five from each of the three countries. t4 JPAC's role
is to, inter alia, advise the Council on any matter within the scope of the
Agreement and to provide various types of information to the'Secretariat.1
5
As the lengthy menu of objectives in Article 1 of the NAAEC would suggest,
the CEC carries out a wide range of activities. These activities are divided into
four major program areas: (1) Environment, Economy, and Trade; (2) Conserva-
tion of Biodiversity; (3) Pollutants and Health; and (4) Law and Policy.16 The
CEC also administers the North American Fund for Environmental Cooperation
(NAFEC), a grant program that provides funding for community-based environ-
mental projects in Canada, Mexico, and the United States.' 7 Another significant
CEC responsibility is to implement a "citizen submission" process, in which
citizens may file "submissions" asserting that any of the three signatory coun-
tries is not enforcing its environmental laws effectively.' 8
11. See id. art. 9(1). Section 9(1) provides specifically that the Council is comprised of "cabinet-level or
equivalent representatives of the Parties, or their designees." Id.
12. See id. art. 11.
13. See id. art. 16.
14. See id. art. 16(1). JPAC members have a range of backgrounds. For example, of the U.S. members of
JPAC, Peter Berle is a lawyer, former president/CEO of the National Audubon Society, and a former
Commissioner of the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. Jonathan Plaut is the retired
director of environmental quality for Allied Signal, Inc. In addition to Mr. Berle and Mr. Plaut, the other current
U.S. members of JPAC are Steve Owens, an attorney in Arizona, and John Wirth, president of the North
American Institute. CEC's home page provides biographical information on each JPAC member. It also contains
the JPAC Vision Statement and the Rules of Procedure that govern JPAC's work. See generally Joint Public
Advisory Committee (visited Apr. 5, 2000) <http:/ www.cec.org/jpac>.
15. See NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 16(4)-(5).
16. See generally CEC, NORTH AMERICAN AGENDA FOR ACION 1999-2001: A THREE-YEAR PROGRAM PLAN
FOR THE COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION, available at CEC homepage, supra note 2 [hereinafter
NORTH AMERICAN AGENDA].
17. See CEC, Grants for Environmental Cooperation (visited Apr. 8, 2000) <http://dev3.hbe.ca/grants/
index.cfm?varlan =english>.
18. The CEC has various other responsibilities as well. See, e.g., NORTH AMERICAN AGENDA, supra note 16,
at 118. Some observers suggest that while the NAAEC embraces a wide array of activities and areas of focus, its
primary orientation is toward enhancing enforcement of domestic environmental law. See, e.g., David S. Baron,
NAFTA and the Environment-Making the Side Agreement Work, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 603,607 (1995)
(suggesting that "[a]lthough the Side Agreement assigns a variety of functions to the council and the Secretariat,
perhaps the most important deal with proceedings to address alleged failures by Parties to adequately enforce
their environmental law"); Bugeda, supra note 2, at 1596 (stating that the citizen submission process is
"[plerhaps the most important function of the Secretariat of the CEC, and definitely the one that has captured
the most attention..."); A.L.C. de Mestral, The Significance of the NAFTA Side Agreements on Environmental
and Labour Cooperation, 15 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 169, 176 (1998) (suggesting that "Article 14 is the core
provision of the NAAEC..."); Raustiala 1996, supra note 6, at 729 (suggesting that "[tihe NAAEC, though
covering a number of important trade and environmental issues, is centrally concerned with strengthening the
enforcement of domestic environmental law").
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With this brief overview of the CEC's origins, structure, and substantive
responsibilities,' 9 I now turn to a more in-depth review of the aspect of the CEC's
work that is the focus of this article, the citizen submission process. 20
III. THE CITIZEN SUBMISSION PROCESS
Articles 14 and 15 of the NAAEC establish a process through which non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) or persons may file a submission alleging
that a member country is not enforcing its environmental law effectively. 2 ' The
CEC web page summarizes the process as follows:
Under Article 14 of the NAAEC, the Secretariat may consider a submission
from any nongovernmental organization or person asserting that a Party to the
NAAEC is failing to effectively enforce its environmental law. Where the
Secretariat determines that the Article 14(1) criteria are met, it shall then
determine whether the submission merits requesting a response from the Party
named in the submission under Article 14(2). In light of any response provided
by that Party, the Secretariat may recommend to the Council that a factual
record be prepared, in accordance to Article 15. The Council, comprised of the
environmental ministers (or their equivalent) of Canada, Mexico and the U.S.,
may then instruct the Secretariat to prepare a factual record on the submission.
The final factual record is made publicly available upon a two-thirds vote of the
Council.22
The Council adopted Guidelines in October 1995 in order to provide additional
guidance concerning this process z3 The Council approved revisions to these
Guidelines during its June 1999 annual meeting in Banff, Canada. 4
19. For a more in-depth discussion of the CEC's structure and responsibilities, see, e.g., JOHNSON &
BEAULEU, supra note 3, at 132-60.
20. This process is by no means completely unrelated to other CEC work. For example, one of the work
projects of the Law and Policy program area involves review of compliance indicators, a topic directly related to
the central issue of Article 14 and 15 submissions, notably whether a party is effectively enforcing its
environmental laws. See JoHNsoN & BEAULIEU, supra note 3, at 113; see also CEC, INDICATORS OF EFFEcTIVE
ENvmIRoNmEtsrAL EN oRcEMEtr: PROCEEDINGS OF A NORTH AMERIcAN DIALOGUE (1999), available at CEC
homepage, supra note 2 [hereinafter CEC INDICATORS].
21. NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 14(1). Section (1)(f) of Article 14 makes clear that the person or organization
filing the submission must reside or be established in the territory of a party. See id.
22. CEC homepage, supra note 2.
23. See CEC Council Resolution 95-10 (Oct. 13, 1995), available at CEC homepage, supra note 2.
24. See CEC Council Resolution 99-06 (June 28, 1999), available at CEC homepage, supra note 2;
Guidelines for Submissions on Enforcement Matters under Articles 14 and 15 of the North American Agreement
on Environmental Cooperation (June 28, 1999), available at CEC homepage, supra note 2 [hereinafter
Guidelines]. The Guidelines, for example, provide details on how submissions must be submitted: in writing, in
a language designated by one of the Parties, not exceeding 15 pages in length excluding supporting information,
etc. See Guidelines, supra, Nos. 3.1-3.3.
JPAC provided an Advice to Council in which JPAC advised the Council not to revise the Guidelines. See
JPAC Advice to Council 99-01 (Mar. 25, 1999), available at CEC homepage, supra note 2. JPAC explained the
three primary bases for its recommendation as follows:
[Vol. 12:545
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A. ARTICLE 14(1)
The Secretariat of the CEC conducts an initial review of a citizen submission
under Article 14(1) of the NAAEC. The opening sentence of Article 14(1)
provides that "[t]he Secretariat may consider a submission ... asserting that a
Party is failing to effectively enforce its environmental law .... ,,25 This sentence
limits the scope of the Article 14 process in three ways, to submissions involving:
(1) one or more "environmental law(s);" (2) further, to failures to "effectively
enforce" such environmental laws; and (3) temporally, to failures fitting into the
first two categories that are ongoing in nature.26 These three concepts are
reviewed briefly below.
1. "Environmental Law"
The Agreement defines "environmental law" to include laws "the primary
purpose of which is the protection of the environment, or the prevention of a
danger to human life or health .... , 27 The CEC has concluded that a wide
By far the majority of those members of the public who provided written comments [on the proposed
revisions to the Guidelines] and those who participated in the workshop held the view that the case
had not been made to support the revision process;
The proposed revisions were tested by the workshop participants against an agreed upon set of
criteria namely, accessibility, transparency, independence of the Secretariat, balance/parity between
party and submitter, impartiality, discretionality and conformity to the NAAEC. With a few minor
exceptions it was concluded that the proposed revisions detracted from these criteria, in certain cases
seriously so.
The argument for change has not been made and to do so at this time would undermine public
confidence in the citizen submission process. Indeed, the proposed changes would slow the process,
make it more bureaucratic and less transparent.
Id. In finalizing its revisions to the Guidelines, the Council indicated that it was "[m]indful of the public
comments received and of JPAC Advice 99-01." CEC Council Resolution 99-06, supra.
25. NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 14(1) (emphasis added).
26. Id. Article 45(1) is relevant to the scope of this clause as well, providing as follows:
For purposes of this Agreement:
A Party has not failed to "effectively enforce its environmental law" [emphasis added] ... in a
particular case where the action or inaction in question by agencies or officials of that Party:
reflects a reasonable exercise of their discretion in respect of investigatory, prosecutorial, regula-
tory or compliance matters; or
results from bonafide decisions to allocate resources to enforcement in respect of other environmen-
tal matters determined to have higher priorities....
Id. art. 45(1).
27. See id. art. 45(2)(a). Article 45(2)(a) provides as follows:
(a) "environmental law" means any statute or regulation of a Party, or provision thereof, the primary
purpose of which is the protection of the environment, or the prevention of a danger to human life or
health, through
(i) the prevention, abatement or control of the release, discharge, or emission of pollutants or
environmental contaminants,
(ii) the control of environmentally hazardous or toxic chemicals, substances, materials and wastes,
and the dissemination of information related thereto, or
(iii) the protection of wild flora or fauna, including endangered species, their habitat, and specially
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variety of laws fall within this definition. Examples include the Canadian Federal
Fisheries28 and Environmental Assessment Acts;29 Mexico's General Law for
Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection (LGEEPA) 30 and its
regulation concerning environmental impact (RIA);3' and the National Environ-
mental Policy, 32 Clean Air,3 3 and Clean Water Acts34 in the United States.
The Secretariat has determined that the definition excludes at least two types of
provisions from treatment under Article 14 even though activities under these
provisions may have significant adverse impacts on the environment. One such
type of provision is that which has as its primary purpose the exploitation or
harvesting of natural resources.35 Some commentators suggest that the plain
language of the Agreement seems to dictate such a result.
36
protected natural areas in the Party's territory, but does not include any statute or regulation, or
provision thereof, directly related to worker safety or health.
(b) For greater certainty, the term "environmental law" does not include any statute or regulation, or
provision thereof, the primary purpose of which is managing the commercial harvest or exploitation,
or subsistence or aboriginal harvesting, of natural resources.
(c) The primary purpose of a particular statutory or regulatory provision for purposes of subpara-
graphs (a) and (b) shall be determined by reference to its primary purpose, rather than to the primary
purpose of the statute or regulation of which it is part.
Id.
28. See Fisheries Act, R.S.C. (1985) (Can.); see also CEC Secretariat, Article 14(1) Determination, B.C.
Aboriginal Fisheries Commission et al., SEM-97-001 (May 1, 1997), available at CEC homepage, supra note 2
(concerning the Fisheries Act).
29. See Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, ch. 37, S.C. (1992) (Can.); see also CEC Secretariat,
Article 14(1) Determination, Friends of Oldman River, SEM-97-006 (Jan. 23, 1998), available at CEC
homepage, supra note 2 (concerning the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act).
30. See Ley General del Equilibrio Ecologico y de Proteccion al Ambiente [LGEEPA]; see also CEC
Secretariat, Article 14(1) Determination, SEM-96-001 (Feb. 6, 1996), available at CEC homepage, supra note 2
[hereinafter Cozumel Article 14(1) Determination] (concerning LGEEPA).
31. See Reglamento de la Ley General del Equilibrio Ecol6gico y la Protecci6n al Ambiente en Materia de
Impacto Ambiental (Mex.).
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.; see also CEC Secretariat, Article 14(1) Determination, Southwest Center
for Biological Diversity et al., SEM-96-004 (Dec. 16, 1996), available at CEC homepage, supra note 2
(concerning NEPA).
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq.; see also CEC Secretariat, Article 14(1) Determination, Dept. of the Planet
Earth et al., SEM-98-003 (Dec. 14, 1998), available at CEC homepage, supra note 2 (concerning the U.S.
Clean Air Act and Pollution Prevention Act).
34. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.
35. See CEC Secretariat, Determination in Accordance with Article 14(1) of the North American Agreement
for Environmental Cooperation, SEM-98-002 (June 23, 1998), available at CEC homepage, supra note 2
(finding that the submission involved a commercial forestry dispute not subject to Article 14). Cf. CEC
Secretariat, Determination Pursuant to Articles 14 & 15 of the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation, SEM-95-002 (Dec. 8, 1995), available at CEC homepage, supra note 2 (dismissed on other
grounds)(finding that submission involving U.S. statute that addressed harvesting of natural resources subject to
Article 14 review).
36. See, e.g., Raustiala 1996, supra note 6, at 746 (stating that "[niatural resource management statutes are
clearly environmental laws by any reasonable understanding of the word, yet they are expressly denied that
status in the Article 45 definition"); Greg Block, NAFTA's Environmental Provisions: Are They Working As
Intended? Are They Adequate?, 23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 409, 412 (1997) (noting that "[t]he NAAEC has a rather
unusual definition of environmental law, excluding from Articles 14 and 15 the exploitation or harvesting of
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A second issue that has arisen involves whether international legal instruments
qualify as "environmental law." The Secretariat has concluded that at least in
some instances they do not. It recently addressed this issue in its determination in
connection with the Great Lakes submission.37 It found that neither the Great
Lakes Water Quality Agreement 38 nor the 1986 Agreement Between the Govern-
ment of the United States of America and the Government of Canada Concerning
the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste 39 should be considered an
"environmental law" for purposes of Article 14, noting as follows:
Article 45(2) of the NAAEC is the key operative provision, defining environ-
mental law to mean "any statute or regulation of a Party .... The Secretariat
dismissed the Animal Alliance submission (SEM-97-005) on the ground that
the Biodiversity Convention did not qualify as "environmental law" because it
was an international obligation that had not been imported into domestic law by
way of statute or regulation pursuant to a statute. The Animal Alliance
determination is consistent with the plain language of Article 45(2) and the
Secretariat follows it here. As noted concerning that submission, by making
this determination, the Secretariat is not excluding the possibility that future
submissions may raise questions concerning a Party's international obligations
that would meet the criteria in Article 14(1).4
0
A potential third significant exclusion are laws "directly related to worker
safety or health."'' 4 No submission to date has raised this issue. As a result, the
Secretariat has not yet had occasion to apply this exclusion.
2. "Effective Enforcement"
Submissions have asserted that the parties have "failed to effectively enforce"
their environmental laws on a variety of grounds. Perhaps the most common to
date has been the assertion that one or more regulated parties are violating
environmental requirements and the government is failing to enforce effectively
natural resources"); Steve Charnovitz, The NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement: Implications for Environ-
mental Cooperation, Trade Policy, and American Treatymaking, 8 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 257, 267 (1994)
[hereinafter Charnovitz 1994] (asserting that "[t]he term 'environmental law' is ... sharply circumscribed"
because of this limitation, among others).
37. See Dept. of Planet Earth et al., NGO Petition to the North American Commission for Environmental
Cooperation for an Investigation and Creation of a Factual Record, SEM-98-003 (May 28, 1998), available at
CEC homepage, supra note 2 [hereinafter Great Lakes Submission]; CEC Secretariat, Determination Pursuant
to Article 14(1) and (2) of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, SEM-98-003 (Sept.
8, 1999), available at CEC homepage, supra note 2 [hereinafter Great Lakes Article 14(1) and (2)-Determina-
tion].
38. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978, U.S.-Can., 30 U.S.T. 1383.
39. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada
Concerning the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste, Oct. 28, 1986, available in 1986 WL 235022.
40. Great Lakes Article 14(1) and (2) Determination, supra note 37.
41. NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 45(2)(a)(iii).
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the requirements because of allegedly inadequate inspection practices, prosecution-
related efforts, or both. With respect to recent submissions involving the United
States, some of the assertions contained in the Great Lakes submission fall into
this category.42 The BC Hydro and BC Mining submissions involving Canada do
so as well. 43 The Secretariat has found that this type of assertion falls within the
scope of Article 14(t).44 Failure to enforce NEPA-type requirements has also
been asserted and found to warrant a request for a response.45
In contrast, the Secretariat dismissed two early submissions on the ground that
they challenged legislative acts and did not involve assertions of ineffective
"enforcement.", 46 The Secretariat dismissed the Biodiversity Legal Foundation
submission, finding that a rider modifying implementation of the Endangered
Species Act was not a failure to enforce environmental law.4 7 The Secretariat
determined that this submission, which alleged that a party's legislation did not
42. See Great Lakes Article 14(1) and (2) Determination, supra note 37.
43. See B.C. Aboriginal Fisheries Commission et al., Submission to the Commission on the Environmental
Cooperation Pursuant to Article 14 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation,
SEM-97-001 (Apr. 1997), available at CEC homepage, supra note 2 [hereinafter BC Hydro Submission]; Sierra
Club of British Columbia, et al., The Government of Canada's Failure to Enforce the Fisheries Act Against
Mining Companies in British Columbia: A Submission To The Commission On Environmental Cooperation
Pursuant to Article 14 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, SEM-98-004 (June
29, 1998), available at CEC homepage, supra note 2 [hereinafter BC Mining Submission]. The Council has
reviewed the BC Hydro submission and agreed it met the requirements of Article 14(1). See CEC Council
Resolution 98-07 (June 24, 1998), available at CEC homepage, supra note 2.
44. See, e.g., Great Lakes Submission, supra note 37; BC Hydro Submission, supra note 43; BC Mining
Submission, supra note 43.
45. See, e.g., Comit6 para la Protecci6n de los Recursos Naturales, A.C., et al., SEM-96-001 (Jan. 17, 1996),
available at CEC homepage, supra note 2 [hereinafter Cozumel Submission]; Great Lakes Submission, supra
note 37; JOHNSON & BEAUUEU, supra note 3, at 153.
46. CEC Secretariat, Determination Under Article 14(2), SEM 95-001 (Sept. 21, 1995), available at CEC
homepage, supra note 2 [hereinafter Biodiversity Legal Foundation 14(2) Determination]. For a generally
positive review of the Secretariat's determination, see Raustiala 1996, supra note 6, at 725, 746-57. For a
negative evaluation, see Jay Tutchton, The Citizen Petition Process Under NAFTA 's Environmental Side
Agreement: It's Easy to Use, But Does It Work?, 26 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,031 (Envtl. L. Inst. 1996). For a third
perspective, see MacCallum, supra note 7, at 405-09. The Secretariat reached the same conclusion in the Sierra
Club Submission. See CEC Secretariat, Determination UnderArticle 14 & 15 of the North American Agreement
on Environmental Cooperation, SEM-95-002 (Dec. 8, 1995), available at CEC homepage, supra note 2.
Some commentators appear to agree that this limit exists in the Agreement but believe it should not. See, e.g.,
JOHNSON & BEAuLmu, supra note 3, at 165 (suggesting that there was "no reason to restrict the NGO
submissions.., to 'enforcement' matters. NGOs should have been allowed to present evidence establishing that
a NAFTA party is lowering environmental norms in an attempt to attract investments."). Other observers
highlight the difficulty of separating enforcement from lawmaking, with one commentator characterizing the
Secretariat's determinations in the two above-referenced submissions as "puzzling." Gal-Or, supra note 2, at
76. Professor Raustalia similarly suggests that the distinction between enforcement and lawmaking is a false
one. See, e.g., Kal Raustalia, The Political Implications of the Enforcement Provisions of the NAFTA
Environmental Side Agreement: The CEC as a Model for Future Accords, 25 ENVTL. L. 131, 133, 148 (1996).
The Secretariat's most recent treatment of this issue is in its Great Lakes Determination. See CEC Secretariat,
Determination Pursuant to Article 14(1) of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation,
SEM-98-003 (Dec. 14, 1998), available at CEC homepage, supra note 2 [hereinafter Great Lakes Article 14(1)
Determination].
47. See Biodiversity Legal Foundation 14(2) Determination, supra note 46.
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protect the environment, was not "actionable" under the citizen submission
process because its focus was on the appropriateness or effectiveness of the
legislation itself."8 The Secretariat's reasoning was as follows:
The enactment of legislation which specifically alters the operation of pre-
existing environmental law in essence becomes a part of the greater body of
environmental laws and statutes on the books ... The Secretariat therefore
cannot characterize the application of a new legal regime as a failure to enforce
an old one.49
In sum, the Secretariat strategy in this area to date has been to draw a line
between government efforts to establish environmental standards and govern-
ment efforts to enforce such standards once they are established. It has indicated
that the former are beyond the scope of Article 14 while the latter are legitimate
areas of inquiry under the Article 14 process. To quote from the Great Lakes
Determination, in making such a distinction the Secretariat has noted that
"drawing the line between 'standard-setting' and 'enforcement' of the law may
be blurred on occasion and difficult to discern at the margins." 5 ° Submissions on
the margins are likely to elicit additional CEC efforts to draw such lines.
3. The Temporal Requirement in Article 14(1)
Two temporal issues have emerged in the implementation of Article 14. First,
there is the requirement that submitters assert that a party "is failing" to
effectively enforce its environmental law.51 In Canadian Environmental Defence
Fund, the Submitters asserted that the Canadian government had failed to enforce
a Canadian law requiring environmental assessment of federal policies and
52programs. The submission, however, was filed three years after the program at
issue came into effect. The program had since been discontinued. The Secretariat
dismissed the submission on the ground that it did not satisfy the temporal
requirement in Article 14 that a party to the Agreement "is failing" to effectively
enforce its environmental law.53 The Secretariat noted that, among other things, it
was "not aware of any reason that would have prevented the Submitter from
filing its submission at the time it became aware of the alleged failure to
enforce."
5
"
48. See id.
49. Id.
50. Great Lakes Article 14(1) Determination, supra note 46.
51. See NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 14(1).
52. Canadian Environmental Defence Fund, Article 14 Submission Made Pursuant to the North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, SEM 97-004 (May 26, 1997), available at CEC homepage, supra
note 2 [hereinafter Canadian Environmental Defence Fund Submission].
53. CEC Secretariat, Article 14(1) Determination, SEM-97-004 (Aug. 25, 1997), available at CEC
homepage, supra note 2 (emphasis added) [hereinafter Canadian Environmental Defence Fund Determination].
54. Id.
2000]
THE GEORGETOWN INT'L ENVTL. LAW REVIEW
The second temporal issue involves the extent to which the Secretariat may
consider events that occurred before the NAAEC became effective on January 1,
1994. The Commission's response to this issue has two parts. First, it has noted
that there is no indication that the Agreement is to be given retroactive effect.55 In
addition, however, the Secretariat has concluded that "conditions or situations"
that existed before January 1, 1994 may be relevant to a "present, continuing
failure to enforce environmental law.", 56 This issue first was considered in the
Cozumel submission, the third submission to come before the Secretariat.57 The
Council's Resolution directing the Secretariat to prepare a factual record concern-
ing the BC Hydro submission provides the Council's latest word on this issue.58
In that Resolution the Council directed the Secretariat
to consider whether the party concerned "is failing to effectively enforce its
environmental law" since the entry into force of the NAAEC on 1 January
1994. In considering such an alleged failure to effectively enforce, relevant
facts that existed prior to 1 January 1994, may be included in the factual
record. ...
In sum, one submission to date has been dismissed on the basis that it did not
satisfy the "temporal" requirement in Article 14 that a party to the Agreement be
failing to effectively enforce its environmental law. 60 As a general matter, the
Secretariat has determined that the NAAEC does not apply retroactively. 6' It also
has determined, on the other hand, and the Council has agreed, that an alleged
violation of an environmental law that occurred pre- 1994 may be a relevant focus
for a factual record if the alleged violation is relevant to whether a party
effectively enforced its environmental law post-1994.62
55. See CEC Secretariat, Recommendation of the Secretariat to Council for the Development of a Factual
Record in Accordance with Articles 14 and 15 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Coopera-
tion, SEM-96-001 (June 7, 1996), available at CEC homepage, supra note 2 [hereinafter Cozumel Recommen-
dation].
56. Id.
57. See Cozumel Submission, supra note 45.
58. See CEC Council Resolution 98-07 (June 24, 1998), available at CEC homepage, supra note 2.
59. Id.
60. See Canadian Environmental Defence Fund Determination, supra note 52. As this article was going to
press, a second submission was dismissed because, inter alia, it did not satisfy the "temporal" requirement. See
CEC Secretariat, Determination in Accordance with Article 14(1) of the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation, SEM-00-003 (Apr. 12, 2000), available at CEC homepage, supra note 2
(determining that the submission was premature because the government action that constituted the asserted
failure to effectively enforce had not yet been taken).
61. See Cozumel Recommendation, supra note 55.
62. See Cozumel Submission, supra note 45; BC Hydro Submission, supra note 43. In connection with the
Cozumel Submission, the Secretariat stated:
Article 47 of the NAAEC indicates the Parties intended the Agreement to take effect on January 1,
1994. The Secretariat is unable to discern any intentions, express or implied, conferring retroactive
effect on the operation of Article 14 of the NAAEC. Notwithstanding the above, events or acts
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4. Article 14(1)'s Six Listed Threshold Criteria
In addition to the three parameters for the Article 14 citizen submission process
contained in Article 14(1)'s opening sentence, this provision specifically lists six
threshold criteria that submissions must meet in order to trigger further consider-
ation. Submissions must:
(a) [be] in writing in a language designated by that Party in a notification to
the Secretariat;
(b) clearly identif[y] the person or organization making the submission;
(c) provide[ ] sufficient information to allow the Secretariat to review the
submission, including any documentary evidence on which the submission
may be based;
(d) appear[ ] to be aimed at promoting enforcement rather than at harassing
industry;
(e) indicate[ ] that the matter has been communicated in writing to the
relevant authorities of the Party and indicates the Party's response, if any; and
(f) [be] filed by a person or organization residing or established in the
territory of a Party.
6 3
These criteria are fairly straightforward. A number of substantive points,
however, warrant mention. First, the Guidelines make it clear that the Article
14(1)(c) requirement that a submitter provide "sufficient information" includes
the obligation to identify the applicable environmental statute or regulation
allegedly not being effectively enforced. 64 The Secretariat requested that the
submitters in Rio Magdalena further specify which laws allegedly were not being
effectively enforced.6 5
Second, the Guidelines elaborate on the Article 14(1)(d) requirement that a
submission "appear[ ] to be aimed at promoting enforcement rather than at
harassing industry.",66 Guideline No. 5.4 provides that:
A submission must appear to be aimed at promoting enforcement rather than at
harassing industry. In making that determination, the Secretariat will consider
such factors as whether or not:
(a) the submission is focused on the acts or omissions of a Party rather
than on compliance by a particular company or business; especially if the
concluded prior to January 1, 1994, may create conditions or situations that give rise to current
enforcement obligations. It follows that certain aspects of these conditions or situations may be
relevant when considering an allegation of a present, continuing failure to enforce environmental law.
Cozumel Recommendation, supra note 55.
63. NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 14(1).
64. See Guidelines, supra note 23, No. 5.2.
65. See CEC Secretariat, Request for Additional Information from the Submitters, SEM-97-002 (July 2,
1997), available at CEC homepage, supra note 2.
66. NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 14(1)(d).
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Submitter is a competitor that may stand to benefit economically from the
submission;
(b) the submission appears frivolous. 6 7
Submitters typically have addressed Article 14(1)(d) by affirming their interest
in environmental enforcement. In one submission the submitter expressly notes
that it has no industry ties or commercial interest in the issue.68 The submissions
filed to date have focused on the acts or omissions of a party, not on the conduct
of individual companies, though in some situations, such as state-owned compa-
nies, the distinction is a fine one. Perhaps for this reason, subsection (1)(d) of
Article 14 has received relatively little attention in the Secretariat's - or the
Council's - review of early submissions.
The revised Guidelines for the Article 14/15 process issued in July 1999 make
one change to the process of review under Article 14(1) that warrants reference
here. The revised Guidelines require the Secretariat to include its reasons in
making its determination under Article 14(1).69 Prior to these revisions, the
Secretariat had only provided such reasons in determinations in which it
dismissed a submission for failing to meet the criteria. In its relatively brief
determinations finding that submissions met the Article 14(1) criteria, the
Secretariat typically did not go into detail concerning its reasoning. Thus, this
new provision is likely to result in lengthier Article 14(1) determinations than
were seen in the first few years of the process.
A final issue relating to Article 14(1) concerns the appropriate level of analysis
at this preliminary stage of the process. The Secretariat has discussed this issue in
its recent determination concerning the Great Lakes Submission, among others.7 °
The Secretariat indicates that, at least conceptually, an Article 14(1) review is not
intended to be unduly searching, and the requirements contained in Article 14 are
not intended to place an undue burden on submitters. In the determination
concerning the Animal Alliance Submission (SEM-97-005), for example, the
Secretariat states as follows:
The Secretariat is of the view that Article 14, and Article 14(1) in particular, are
not intended to be insurmountable screening devices. The Secretariat also
believes that Article 14(1) should be given a large and liberal interpretation,
consistent with the objectives of the NAAEC.... 7
In its discussion in the Animal Alliance Determination of the burden under
Article 14, the Secretariat noted that use of the word "assertion" in the opening
67. Guidelines, supra note 23, No. 5.4.
68. See Earthlaw, Submission Pursuant to Article 14 of the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation, SEM-96-004 (Nov. 14, 1996), available at CEC homepage, supra note 2.
69. See Guidelines, supra note 23, No. 7.2.
70. See Great Lakes Article 14(l) Determination, supra note 46.
71. CEC Secretariat, Determination Pursuant to Article 14(1) of the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation, SEM-97-005 (May 26, 1998), available at CEC homepage, supra note 2
[hereinafter Animal Alliance Determination].
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sentence of Article 14(1) "supports a relatively low threshold under Article
14( 1),,,72 although it also indicated that "a certain amount of substantive analysis
is nonetheless required at this initial stage" because " [o]therwise, the Secretariat
would be forced to consider all submissions that merely 'assert' a failure to
effectively enforce environmental law.",
73
The Secretariat noted in its Great Lakes Determination that the revisions to the
Guidelines implicitly recognize that a submitter's capacity to provide details to
support its assertions is limited by the mechanics of the process:
The recent revisions to the Guidelines provide further support for the notion
that the Article 14(1) and (2) stages of the citizen submission process are
intended as a screening mechanism. The Guidelines limit submissions to 15
pages in length. The revised Guidelines require a submitter to address a
minimum of 13 criteria or factors in this limited space, indicating that a
submission is not expected to contain extensive discussion of each criterion and
factor in order to qualify under Article 14(1) and (2) for more in-depth
consideration.7 4
The track record thus far suggests that the Secretariat is taking its initial
screening responsibility under Article 14(1) seriously. Several of the twenty-six
submissions made to date have been dismissed as deficient under Article 14(1).75
It will be interesting to monitor whether the percentage of early dismissals
declines over time as submitters become more comfortable with the process and
as the CEC begins to establish clear parameters for the types of issues subject to
Article 14 review.
B. ARTICLE 14(2)
Article 14(2) of the citizen submission process provides that when the
Secretariat determines that a submission meets the Article 14(1) criteria, the
Secretariat shall determine whether the submission merits a request for a
response from the party. This second determination is guided by the Secretariat's
consideration of whether:
(a) the submission alleges harm to the person or organization making the
submission;
(b) the submission, alone or in combination with other submissions, raises
matters whose further study in this process would advance the goals of this
Agreement;
72. The relevant part of Article 14(1) reads: "The Secretariat may consider a submission from any non
governmental organization or person asserting that .... NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 14(1) (emphasis added).
73. Animal Alliance Determination, supra note 71.
74. Great Lakes Article 14(1) and 14(2) Determination, supra note 37; see also Guidelines, supra note 23,
No. 3.3.
75. See infra Part IV.
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(c) private remedies available under the Party's law have been pursued; and
(d) the submission is drawn exclusively from mass media reports. 76
Perhaps the most important point is that these "guiding factors" play a
different role in the Secretariat's review than do the criteria in Article 14(1). If a
submitter fails to meet a single Article 14(1) criterion, the Secretariat must
dismiss the submission.77 In contrast, the Secretariat is guided by the Article
14(2) factors in determining whether to continue the process by requesting that
the Party respond to the submission and in making this determination the
Secretariat "may assign weight to each factor as it deems appropriate in the
context of a particular submission."
78
With respect to the specific Article 14(2) factors, the Guidelines elaborate on
the type of harm contemplated in Article 14(2)(a). The Guidelines indicate that
the harm should be due to the asserted failure of enforcement. Further, the harm
should relate to protection of the environment or prevention of danger to human
life or health. Guideline No. 7.4 provides as follows:
In considering whether the submission alleges harm to the person or organiza-
tion making the submission, the Secretariat will consider such factors as
whether:
(a) the alleged harm is due to the asserted failure to effectively enforce
environmental law; and
(b) the alleged harm relates to the protection of the environment or the
prevention of danger to human life or health (but not directly related to worker
safety or health), as stated in Article 45(2) of the Agreement.79
The Secretariat's request for a response in the Cozumel Submission treated the
"harm" issue as follows:
In considering harm, the Secretariat notes the importance and character of
the resource in question - a portion of the magnificent Paradise coral reef
located in the Caribbean waters of Quintana Roo. While the Secretariat
recognizes that the submitters may not have alleged the particularized, indi-
vidual harm required to acquire legal standing to bring suit in some civil
proceedings in North America, the especially public nature of marine resources
bring[s] the submitters within the spirit and intent of Article 14 of the
NAAEC. 80
A number of commentators have applauded the Secretariat's approach concern-
ing the notion of harm as an appropriately broad interpretation for purposes of the
76. NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 14(2)(d).
77. See id. art. 14(1).
78. Great Lakes Article 14(1) and 14(2) Determination, supra note 37.
79. Guidelines, supra note 23, No. 7.4.
80. Cozumel Recommendations, supra note 55.
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Agreement.8 1 Professor Gal-Or, for example, suggests that " [b]y recognizing the
public nature of environmental concerns and harms as well as the right of the
public interest to legal standing, the Secretariat has met the expectations of many
environmental activists."' 82 It will be interesting to monitor the application of this
provision. The issue of harm has proved contentious in the U.S. citizen suit context.83
The second Article 14(2) factor - subsection (b) - involves whether the
submission raises matters whose further study in this process would advance the
goals of the NAAEC.84 This factor, among other things, provides an important
context for the CEC's fulfillment of its responsibilities under Article 14. The
Article 14 process charges an international institution, the CEC, with reviewing
domestic enforcement practices. Consideration of Article 14(2)(b) should help
the CEC to keep in mind its status as an international institution with a
continental reach as the Secretariat addresses individual submissions and makes
judgments as to which warrant further review under this process.
The Article 14(2)(c) factor of pursuit of private remedies is also worth
mention. Guideline No. 7.5, adopted in Banff, Canada in June 1999, contains
three guideposts for consideration of this factor. First, the Secretariat is to
consider whether a submission may interfere with private domestic litigation
pursued by the submitter.85 Second, the Secretariat is to consider the value of
pursuing a submission in light of any such litigation.86 Finally, the Guidelines
indicate that a "reasonableness" standard should be used in reviewing pursuit of
private remedies.87 The Guidelines provide as follows on this issue:
In considering whether private remedies available under the Party's law have
been pursued, the Secretariat will be guided by whether:
(a) requesting a response to the submission is appropriate if the preparation
of a factual record on the submission could duplicate or interfere with private
remedies that are being pursued or have been pursued by the Submitter; and
(b) reasonable actions have been taken to pursue such remedies prior to
initiating a submission, bearing in mind that barriers to the pursuit of such
remedies may exist in some cases.88
81. See Gal-Or, supra note 2, at 89.
82. Id. Gal-Or also suggests that environmental activists "have seen the NAAEC as a vehicle to enhancing
public participation in dispute resolution." Id. See Bugeda, supra note 2, at 1609 (discussing Cozumel and
noting "[i]t is clear that the Secretariat met the expectations of many environmental groups by adopting a broad
interpretation of Article 14(2)(a)..."); see also Baron, supra note 18, at 609 (urging an interpretation of the sort
articulated in Cozumel).
83. See generally Craig N. Johnston, 1999 - The Year in Review, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,173, 10,180-85
(Envtl. L. Inst. 2000); JotN D. ECHEVERRIA & JON T. ZEIDLER, BARELY STANDING: THE EROSION OF CITIZEN
"STANDING" TO SUE TO ENFORCE FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Environmental Policy Project, Georgetown
University Law Center, 1999) (on file with GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV.).
84. See NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 14(2)(b).
85. See Guidelines, supra note 23, No. 7.5.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. Id.
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The fourth, and final, Article 14(2) factor involves the extent to which the
submission is "drawn exclusively from mass media reports." 89 This factor has
received relatively little attention to date. Submissions that are drawn exclusively
from mass media reports are probably less likely than others to warrant further
consideration, other factors being equal.
Moving from the specific Article 14(2) factors to how Article 14(2) fits into the
Article 14 process, the Secretariat has two options upon completion of its review
under Article 14(2). First, it may unilaterally dismiss a submission. 90 Alterna-
tively, the Secretariat may decide to request a response from the party. As of April
17, 2000, the Secretariat has now requested party responses for sixteen submis-
sions.9 t In either case, the revised Guidelines require the Secretariat to explain its
reasons. 92 If the Secretariat pursues the latter course, the next phase involves the
Secretariat's consideration of the response, as well as the submission, under
Article 15(1) to determine whether to recommend to the Council the develop-
ment of a factual record.9 3
C. ARTICLE 15
If the Secretariat determines, after receiving the party's response, that a factual
record is not appropriate, it dismisses the submission and provides its reasons in
the dismissal.9 4 If the Secretariat considers that a factual record is warranted, it so
advises the Council and provides its reasons.95 The Council then votes whether to
direct the Secretariat to develop such a record.9 6 While much of the Council's
work is done by "consensus,", 97 the Agreement specifically provides that a
two-thirds vote is sufficient to initiate development of a factual record.98
89. NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 14(2)(d).
90. See infra Part IV.
91. See id.
92. See Guidelines, supra note 23, No. 9.6. The Secretariat may request additional information from the
party if, inter alia, the Secretariat believes such would be helpful to its completion of this stage of the process.
See NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 21(l)(b).
93. See NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 15(1).
94. See Guidelines, supra note 23, No. 9.6. If the party does not provide a response within the requisite time
frame, the Secretariat may nevertheless begin its consideration of whether to inform the Council that the
submission warrants development of a factual record. See id. No. 9.5.
95. See NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 15(1).
96. A new provision in the July 1999 revised guidelines provides that the Council may seek "further
explanation" when it receives a recommendation from the Secretariat to develop a factual record. See
Guidelines, supra note 23, No. 10.1.
97. See NAAEC, art. 9(6), supra note 2 (providing that "[a]ll decisions and recommendations of the Council
shall be taken by consensus, except as the Council may otherwise decide or as otherwise provided in this
Agreement"). The term "consensus" is defined as unanimous approval. See Kirton, supra note 4, at 468 (noting
that "[allthough the Council will normally operate by consensus, and thus empower each of the three countries
with a veto, the Council moves from pure national control to supranational constraint in several areas [including
Article 15] ... ") (emphasis added); JoIsoN & BEAULIEU, supra note 3, at 133 (noting that "[t]he
decision-making procedure requires unanimity, unless the agreement provides otherwise").
98. See NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 15(2).
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If the Council decides not to direct development of a factual record, the
Secretariat's last action on the submission is to notify the submitter and inform
the submitter that the submission process is terminated.99
If the Council directs the Secretariat to develop a factual record, the Secretariat
embarks on this task.'0° The Agreement authorizes the Secretariat to gather
factual information relevant to the issues at stake in the submission. Article 15(4)
of the Agreement authorizes the Secretariat to consider "any relevant technical,
scientific or other information"' 0 ' that is (a) publicly available; (b) submitted by
interested non-governmental organizations or persons; (c) submitted by the Joint
Public Advisory Committee; or (d) developed by the Secretariat or by indepen-
dent experts. In addition, the Agreement provides that the Secretariat shall
consider any information furnished by a party.
The Secretariat submits its draft factual records to the Council for review. The
Guidelines specify that draft factual records shall include:
(a) a summary of the submission that initiated the process;
(b) a summary of the response, if any, provided by the concerned Party;
(c) a summary of any other relevant factual information; and
(d) the facts presented by the Secretariat with respect to the matters raised in
the submission. l
0 2
The Agreement provides that "[a]ny Party may provide comments on the
accuracy of the draft within forty-five days thereafter." 10 3 The Secretariat is to
incorporate, "as appropriate," any such comments in its final factual record and
submit the final version to the Council.'o4 The Council then determines whether
to make the final factual record publicly available. Again, a two-thirds vote is
sufficient to make a factual record public. 10 5 The issuance of a final factual record
is the final phase of the Article 14/15 process. '
0 6
99. See Guidelines, supra note 23, No. 10.4.
100. See NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 15(2).
101. Id. art. 15(4).
102. Guidelines, supra note 23, No. 12.1.
103. NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 15(5).
104. Id. art. 15(6).
105. See id. art. 15(7). Guideline No. 13.1 provides:
[Alfter receiving the final factual record, the Council may .decide, by a two-thirds vote, to make it
public. If it so decides, the final factual record will be made public as soon as it is available in the three
official languages of the Commission and a copy will be provided to the Submitter. This should
normally be within 60 days of the submission of the final factual record to the Council.
Guidelines, supra note 23, No. 13.1.
106. Part Five of the Agreement provides a mechanism for a party to initiate a proceeding against another
party regarding "whether there has been a persistent pattern of failure by that other Party to effectively enforce
its environmental law." NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 22(1). While it has not happened to date, there is the
potential that a factual record or information produced pursuant to a factual record process, could be used as part
of, or even to launch, a Part Five proceeding. See Bugeda, supra note 2, at 1603. For a discussion of the Part
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IV. A STATUS UPDATE 10 7
A total of twenty-six submissions have been filed since the Agreement went
into effect in January 1994. Of these, nine involve Mexico, nine involve Canada,
and eight involve the United States. Eleven of these submissions have been
terminated in one way or another; the other fifteen are currently pending. The
eleven that are no longer pending were resolved in three different ways:
dismissal, withdrawal, and publication of a factual record.
Dismissed. Nine submissions are no longer pending because they have been
dismissed by the Secretariat. Eight submissions have been dismissed under
Article 14(1) or (2):
* Canadian Environmental Defence Fund (SEM-97-004),
* Animal Alliance of Canada et al. (SEM-97-005),
* Ortfz Martinez (SEM-98-002),
• Biodiversity Legal Foundation et al. (SEM-95-001),
* Sierra Club et al. (SEM-95-002),
* Aage Tottrup (SEM-96-002),
* Hudson River Audubon Society of Westchester, Inc. et al. (SEM-00-003), and
* Instituto de Derecho Ambiental, A.C., et al. (SEM-98-001).
The Secretariat dismissed this last submission twice in determinations dated
September 13, 1999 and January 11, 2000. The Secretariat dismissed a ninth
submission, Department of the Planet Earth et al. (SEM-98-003) in December
1998, but this submission is treated as currently pending because the submitter
filed a revised submission following the dismissal. The Secretariat dismissed a
tenth submission, Oldman River I (SEM-96-003) in 1996. The submitters
amended the submission and the Secretariat determined that it met the require-
ments of Articles 14(1) and (2) but later dismissed it under Article 15(1).
Withdrawn. One submission, The Southwest Center for Biological Diversity et
al. (SEM-96-004), has been withdrawn.
Completed Preparation of Factual Record. One Factual Record, Comit6 para
la Protecci6n de los Recursos Naturales, A.C. et al. (SEM-96-001), has been
prepared and made public.
Of the fifteen submissions currently under review, one is undergoing factual
record development, three are pending votes from the Council in connection with
the Secretariat's recommendation for development of a factual record, seven
are being reviewed to determine whether development of a factual record is
Five process, see, e.g., Kirton, supra note 4, at 469 (suggesting that it is likely that this procedure will see little if
any use because the three governments will "accept an implicit mutual nonaggression pact, and be reluctant to
launch enforcement investigations against one another for fear that their partners will retaliate by launching
similarly embarrassing investigations against them"); Bugeda, supra note 2, at 1594-96.
107. This status update is current as of April 17, 2000. Additional information concerning each submission is
available on the CEC website. Footnotes detailing the source of the information for each submission therefore
are not included.
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warranted, two are awaiting a response from a Party, and two are being reviewed
under Article 14(1).
Undergoing Factual Record Development. The Secretariat is currently devel-
oping a factual record on one submission, B.C. Aboriginal Fisheries Commission
et al. (SEM-97-001).
Pending Votes. Three submissions are awaiting direction from Council concern-
ing possible development of a factual record. On July 19, 1999, the Secretariat
informed the Council that the Secretariat considers that the Friends of the
Oldman River submission (SEM-97-006) warrants development of a factual
record. On October 29, 1999, the Secretariat informed the Council that the
Secretariat considers that another submission, Centre Qurbrcois du Droit de
L'environnement et al. (SEM-97-003), also warrants developing a factual record.
On March 6, 2000, the Secretariat informed the Council that the Secretariat
considers that a third submission, Environmental Health Coalition, et al. (SEM-
98-007), warrants developing a factual record. As indicated above, the Council
may, by two-thirds vote, instruct the Secretariat to prepare a factual record on one
or more of these submissions.
Awaiting Determination of Whether Development of a Factual Record is
Warranted. Seven submissions are being reviewed to determine whether develop-
ment of a factual record is warranted. The Secretariat is currently reviewing:
" one submission concerning Canada: Sierra Club of British Columbia, et al.
(SEM-98-004);
" two concerning the United States: Department of the Planet Earth et al.
(SEM-98-003), and Alliance for the Wild Rockies, et al. (SEM-99-002); and
" four concerning Mexico: Instituto de Derecho Ambiental (SEM-97-007),
Grupo Ecol6gico Manglar A.C. (SEM-98-006), Academia Sonorense de
Derecho Humanos (SEM-98-005), and Comit6 Pro Limpieza del Rio Magada-
lena (SEM-97-002).
These submissions are being reviewed in light of the response to determine
whether development of a factual record is warranted.
Awaiting a Response from a Party. The Secretariat has requested, and is
awaiting submission of, a response for two submissions that the Secretariat has
determined meet the requirements of Article 14(1) and merit a response from the
Party under Article 14(2): Methanex Corporation (SEM-99-001) and Neste
Canada, Inc. (SEM-00-002).
Undergoing Article 14(1) Review. One submission involving Mexico is cur-
rently being reviewed under Article 14(1), Rosa Maria Escalante (SEM-00-001),
submitted on January 27, 2000. A submission involving Canada, David Suzuki
Foundation et al. (SEM-00-004), submitted on March 15, 2000, is also currently
being reviewed under Article 14(1).
The following table summarizes the work the CEC Secretariat has completed
concerning submissions filed under Article 14 from 1995 through 1999.
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TABLE 1
HISTORY OF ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE CEC SECRETARIAT
UNDER ARTICLES 14 AND 15108
Total Undergoing Article
Number Article 14(1) Notifi-
of 14(1) and and 14(2) Article Dismissals cations Draft Actual
Actions 14(2) Deter- Dis- 21(1)(b) Following to Final Final
Year Taken minations missals Requests Response Council Report Report
1999 16 11 2 1 2
1998 11 6 3 1 1
1997 10 6 1 1 1 1
1996 9 6 2 1
1995 5 2 3
V. CLOSING OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ARTICLE
14 PROCESS To DATE AND PROSPECTS FOR THE FuTuRE
There are a host of issues concerning the Article 14 process that merit close
attention. This final part begins with two quite brief observations. It then offers
some thoughts concerning areas for possible future research relating to the
Article 14 process.
The first observation relates to the picture painted by the statistics of the CEC's
actions to date. Of the twenty-six submissions filed to date, the Secretariat has
terminated nine - that is, approximately thirty-five percent. Eight of these were
dismissed at an early stage - Article 14(1) or (2) - while the Secretariat
terminated one - the original Friends of the Oldman River submission - after
receiving the party's response. In addition to these nine dismissals, the Secretariat
has issued dismissals in other instances as well, but the dismissed submissions
were re-submitted (e.g., Department of the Planet Earth et al. and Instituto de
Derecho Ambiental).
I leave to the individual interested reviewer the task of taking a close look at
the details of the individual submissions to decide for himself or herself whether
the percentage of dismissals is too high or too low. The one point that jumps out
from the superficial rendering of numbers, however, is that the Secretariat is
clearly not rubber-stamping submissions on their way through the process
towards development of a factual record. To paraphrase the Secretariat's rela-
tively early determination in Animal Alliance, the record appears to reflect that
108. Article 14(1) and 14(2) determinations issued after June 1999 must include explanations of the
Secretariat's reasoning, per the revised Guidelines. Previous determinations finding that a submission met the
14(1) criteria and/or warranted a response under 14(2) typically did not contain such explanations. Thus, 14(1)
and 14(2) determinations issued since June 1999 tend to be more detailed and elaborate than earlier
determinations.
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the Secretariat is taking seriously its obligation to require more than a "bare
assertion" of a failure to effectively enforce in order to continue the processing of
a submission.' 0 9 At the same time, the fact that the Secretariat has concluded the
Article 14(1) and (2) stages of the process for the majority of submissions by
finding that such submissions warrant continued review under the process should
give some comfort to those concerned that the Secretariat's relationship with the
Council would compromise the Secretariat's independence in performing its
responsibilities. t0
The second observation relates to the status of the currently pending submis-
sions. Over the past year, the Secretariat has moved a significant number of
submissions through the early stages of the process. The result of this Secretariat
activity is that there are now eleven submissions at the later stages of the Article
14 process. There is a bulge of seven submissions at the Article 15(1) stage of the
process. That is, the Secretariat has requested and received responses from the
relevant party and it is now the Secretariat's responsibility to determine whether
to dismiss the submissions or to advise the Council that the development of a
factual record is warranted. In addition, the Secretariat recently took the latter
course with respect to three other submissions, the Friends of the Oldman River,
Centre Qu6brcois du Droit de l'Environnement, and Environmental Health
Coalition, and it is currently awaiting direction from the Council. 1 ' Further, at
the direction of the Council, the Secretariat is currently preparing a factual record
for the BC Hydro submission. Treatment of this substantial number of submis-
sions by the Secretariat and Council in the coming months is likely to provide
109. CEC Secretariat, Determination Pursuant to Article 14(1) of the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation, SEM-97-005 (May 26, 1998), available at CEC homepage, supra note 2.
110. See, e.g., Kirton, supra note 4, at 460 (identifying a critical factor in the CEC's relationship with the
national government as "the independence of the CEC and its Secretariat"); Christopher N. Bolinger, Assessing
the CEC on its Record to Date, 28 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1107, 1125 (1997) (identifying as one criticism of
the CEC that it is insufficiently independent and has to pull its punches). See also JPAC Advice to Council 99-01
(Mar. 25, 1999), available at CEC homepage, supra note 2.
The parties are certainly aware of the issue of inappropriate influence. Article 11(4) of the Agreement is
intended to insulate the Secretariat from inappropriate influence from a party:
In the performance of their duties, the Executive Director and the staff shall not seek or receive
instructions from any government or any other authority external to the Council. Each Party shall
respect the international character of the responsibilities of the Executive Director and the staff and
shall not seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.
NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 11(4).
In their June 28, 1999 Council Resolution concerning the revised Guidelines for the Article 14 process, the
Ministers "[r]ecogniz[e] that the revisions are designed to improve transparency and fairness of the public
submissions process and are consistent with Article 11(4) of the [Agreement] and the Council's commitment to
a process that honors the Secretariat's decision-making role under Article 14 of the Agreement .... CEC
Council Resolution 99-06 (June 28, 1999), available at CEC homepage, supra note 2.
111. See Friends of the Oldman River SEM-97-006, available at CEC homepage, supra note 2; Centre
Qudbdcois du Droit de l'Environnement, SEM-97-003, available at CEC homepage, supra note 2; Environmen-
tal Health Coalition, et. al., SEM-98-007, available at CEC homepage, supra note 2.
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fertile soil for researchers and others interested in additional exploration of this
policy tool.
112
I now turn to some suggestions for areas of possible future research concerning
the Article 14 process. 1 3 I offer an even ten. The first seven focus primarily on
issues relating to the effectiveness of the process, an area of inquiry that is
of obvious importance but also of enormous complexity. 1 4 The last three
112. The Commission, for example, will create a fairly significant track record concerning the types of
situations that warrant development of factual records, as well as, potentially, the types of situations that do not.
See, e.g., Tutchton, supra note 46, at 10,033 (suggesting that there are no established criteria for making such
determinations). Similarly, the Commission is also likely to develop a better understanding of the tools available
to the Secretariat to develop information for inclusion in factual records and of the types of information likely to
be included in such factual records.
113. A considerable amount has already been written about the Article 14 process. A CEC official notes that
the citizen submission process receives the "most media and scholarly attention" of the CEC's programs.
Block, supra note 36, at 412. See also IRC Report, supra note 6, at x (noting that "[a]dministering the citizen
submission process is the best known of the Secretariat's special responsibilities, and also the most controversi-
al"). See, e.g., Kirton, supra note 4, at 459 (noting with respect to the CEC generally that "[m]ore than three
years after the CEC came into existence, there remains considerable disagreement about its overall potential and
actual performance"). Many commentators, while identifying what they consider to be flaws in the citizen
submission process, nevertheless have taken a position of qualified optimism regarding the NAAEC. See, e.g.,
JOHNSON & BEAULIEU, supra note 3, at 152 (suggesting that the NGO submissions procedure "could very well
become the most dynamic and innovative element of the fact-finding and information management mandate of
the Secretariat"); Bolinger, supra note 111; Stephen L. Kass, First Cases Before New NAFTA Forum Suggest Its
Power Will Increase, NAT'L L.J., June 10, 1996, at C5 (suggesting that "[d]espite its limitations, the CEC is on
- the verge of becoming a meaningful forum for the review of long-deferred regional environmental issues and
challenges to inadequate enforcement of domestic environmental laws").
Professor Kirton reports that "[t]he first and largest group of observers are the skeptical critics." Kirton,
supra note 4, at 459. See, e.g., Chamovitz 1994, supra note 36, at 272, 313; Michael J. Kelly, Bringing a
Complaint Under the NAFTA Environmental Side Accord: Difficult Steps Under a Procedural Paper Tiger But
Movement in the Right Direction, 24 PEPP. L. REV. 71, 97 (1996) (arguing that "[tihe NAFTA Environmental
Side Accord can serve as a model for future trade agreements only in a general sense. If future agreements copy
its limited substantive achievements and procedural loopholes wholesale, then little progress has been made.");
Tutchton, supra note 46, at 10,035-36 (concluding that "... the NAAEC's utility as an effective enforcement
tool is highly debatable. While at least facially easy to use, the NAAEC citizen submission process suffers from
several dramatic flaws. With the benefit of hindsight, it does not appear that the environmental community
should be pleased with the NAAEC citizen submission process as it presently operates"); Wirth 1994, supra
note 2, at 781 (indicating that "[tihere are ... a number of potentially insurmountable impediments to a
resolution of [an Article 14] submission on the merits").
For a partial list of articles on the Article 14 process, see Raustiala 1996, supra note 4, at 727 n.24. See also
US GAO, North American Free Trade Agreement: Impacts and Implementation, GAO/T-NSIAD-97-256 at
18-24 (Sept. 11, 1997) (discussing the NAAEC and concluding with respect to the NAAEC and the Labor Side
Agreement that "[alfter 3 1h years of implementation, it is too early to say what definitive effect these side
agreements will have on the environment and labor").
114. The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) is one example of the increasing importance
attached to the issue of performance in the United States. Government Performance and. Results Act of 1993,
Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C and 39 U.S.C.). Some
suggest that program evaluation is not something governments include routinely in program design or
necessarily do very often or particularly well. To quote two distinguished commentators from their 1998 book
on the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency:
[The] EPA has numerous management shortcomings, but none is more damaging to the regulatory
system as a whole than the absence of feedback and evaluation. This absence means [the] EPA has no
CITIZEN SUBMISSION PROCESS
suggestions for areas of research are prompted by the international character of
the Article 14 process and of the CEC as a whole.
The first important issue in evaluating the effectiveness of any policy approach
involves determining its primary purposes. The commentary to date suggests at
least three purposes of the citizen submission process. Many observers would
agree that a fundamental purpose of the process is to enhance domestic environ-
mental enforcement by the three Parties.l" 5 A related purpose is to enhance
environmental protection. In other words, enhancement of domestic enforcement
is a means to an end, and the end is to promote compliance and thereby enhance
environmental protection. 1 6 Article 5 of the Agreement, entitled Government
Enforcement Action, supports the existence of a link between the goal of
enhancing enforcement and the enhancement of compliance and environmental
protection. It provides that "each Party shall effectively enforce its environmen-
tal laws and regulations... [w]ith the aim of achieving high levels of environmen-
tal protection and compliance with its environmental laws and regula-
tions.... 17 A third likely purpose is to promote the emergence of "civil
society" in North America through creation of a new mechanism that facilitates
citizens' interactions with their governments and others on the continent.' 1 8 I
offer these apparent purposes simply as possible starting points. The need to
consider carefully the purposes of the process in evaluating its effectiveness is
obviously a critical element in focusing future research.1' 9
reporting system to tell whether its goals are being accomplished, whether any progress is being
made, or how much work is being done.
J. Clarence Davies & Jan Mazurek, Pollution Control in the United States: Evaluating the System 35 (1998).
Article 10(1)(b) of the NAAEC required the Council to review its operation and effectiveness four years after
the entry into force of the Agreement. In November, 1997, the Council appointed an Independent Review
Committee (IRC) to provide this assessment, which included a review of Article 14 implementation. See IRC
Report, supra note 6, pt. 1. For another substantial review, see DiMento & Doughman, supra note 4.
115. See, e.g., Sarah Richardson, Sovereignty Revisited: Sovereignty, Trade, and the Environment - The
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 24 CAN-U.S. L.J. 183, 190 (1998) (noting that
"[t]aken together, Articles 14 and 15... represent a critical institutional mechanism to encourage the effective
enforcement by the Parties of their domestic environmental law"). Avoiding possible trade distortions from a
lack of vigorous enforcement is part of the reason for seeking such enhancement.
116. At the same time, the Secretariat has pointed out that the focus of the Article 14 process is on
enforcement, not on the underlying environmental laws themselves. See, e.g., Great Lakes Article 14(1) and
14(2) Determination, supra note 37. See also Richardson, supra note 116, at 190 (noting that "in signing the
NAAEC, as a matter of law, no Party has given up its sovereign right to set national environmental priorities,
policies, laws, and regulations at a level that it alone determines").
117. NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 5.
118. See generally MacCallum, supra note 7, at 395-400 (suggesting that the "apparent purpose of Articles
14 and 15 is to enlist the participation of the North American public to help ensure that the Parties abide by their
obligation to enforce their respective environmental laws").
119. See generally Young, supra note 5, at 268 (noting that "participants can and often do develop widely
divergent perceptions of the nature or character of the problem to be solved, and regimes frequently come into
existence in the absence of consensus in the realm of problem definition").
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The logical second question involves ascertaining how best to assess the extent
to which the tool is effective in accomplishing its objectives. Assuming that, for
example, promoting effective enforcement is an important objective of the
process, it is first necessary to define the concept of effective enforcement. The
Agreement offers some general guidance in Article 5 through its reference to
enhancing compliance.t1 20 Article 5 also provides a laundry list of activities that fit
within the notion of enforcement. 121 Article 45 defines when a party has not failed
to effectively enforce its environmental laws for purposes of the Agreement.1
22
Nevertheless, the task of determining the scope of the concept of effective
enforcement under the NAAEC is a difficult one. 123 In the United States, for
example, views concerning how government enforcement efforts should be
evaluated have been much in flux in recent years. 124 In 1997, the CEC initiated a
project to "explore development of indicators or criteria for evaluating the
performance of the Parties in implementing policies and programs for effective
environmental enforcement."' 2 5 Defining "effective enforcement," in short,
appears to be a second threshold challenge for those interested in evaluating the
extent to which the Article 14 process has been successful in promoting such.
A third issue to explore involves determining changes in enforcement practices
in the areas that are the subject of submissions - determining whether govern-
ment enforcement efforts have changed in such areas and how much more
effective they have become (if any). 126 Exploration of this issue requires
treatment of a related question, notably the extent to which the "squeaky wheel"
120. See NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 5.
121. See id.
122. See id. art. 45(1).
123. See, e.g., Charnovitz 1994, supra note 36, at 268; Scott C. Fulton & Lawrence I. Sperling, The Network
of Environmental Enforcement and Compliance Cooperation in North America and the Western Hemisphere, 30
INT'L LAW 111, 128-29, 138 (1996) (noting that" [r]ather than setting forth precise standards for determining the
effectiveness of each country's enforcement actions, the agreement leaves this level of detail to future
development"). Fulton and Sperling state that "precise guidance for measuring the effectiveness of a country's
enforcement program is likely to evolve through cooperative efforts of the parties to improve their programs and
to report environmental results." Fulton & Sperling, supra, at 138. Fulton and Sperling continue, indicating that
the CEC council's cooperative enforcement activities "could include developing ideas on how to measure
results of enforcement programs" and they suggest that "[a] cooperative dialogue on measures of enforcement
success may lead to development of new measures that will account for the behavioral and environmental
benefits that result from enforcement action." Fulton & Sperling, supra, at 138.
124. See generally Markell, supra note 3. The United States has identified three general types of indicators of
effective enforcement: (1) environmental indicators, (2) outcome measures, and (3) input measures. See OFFICE
OF ENFORCEMENT & COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, U.S. EPA, MEASURING THE PERFORMANCE OF EPA's ENFORCEMENT
AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE PROGRAM (1997).
125. CEC INDICATORS, supra note 20.
126. Opportunities for empirical research concerning the impacts of Commission determinations and other
Commission documents, including factual records, exist now and will increase in the future as additional
documents are issued. As noted above, one factual record has been issued to date and preparation of another is in
progress. The Secretariat has requested responses from parties for a significant number of submissions. One
issue that would be interesting to explore is the extent to which different stages of the Article 14 process
influence domestic enforcement policy.
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syndrome is partially or entirely responsible for improvements in enforcement -
again, if any - in areas that are the subject of submissions. At least one World
Bank study of "complaint-based" enforcement strategies suggests that communi-
ties that complain thereby may "capture" more enforcement attention from
government agencies than other communities. '2 7 This related question, therefore,
involves the extent to which any enhancement of enforcement in areas that are
the subject of submissions is due to a reduction in enforcement elsewhere.
A fourth issue involves determining the extent to which the parties have
strengthened their domestic enforcement practices more generally. An obvious
central methodological challenge here, and with respect to the preceding issue as
well, is to establish a link between the Article 14 process (including its use as well
as its potential for use) and any such enhancements.
A fifth issue that relates to the essential character of the citizen submission
process has already received considerable attention in the literature. It is clear
what the citizen submission process is and what it is not. The process offers the
prospect of a "spotlight" on domestic enforcement practices. Some commenta-
tors are optimistic about the possible value of such a "spotlight." 128 The citizen
submission process does not, however, provide for sanctions. Some have labeled
the lack of sanctions a serious, shortcoming. 129 Debate concerning the likely
effectiveness of the Article 14 process in light of its essential character as a
"spotlight" and in light of its lack of sanctions is being replayed on a wide variety
of stages throughout the world. There is currently an enormous amount of debate
about the relative merits of different compliance-oriented approaches. Some
suggest that sanctions are needed, 130 while others tout the promise of spotlights
127. SUSMiTA DASGUPTA & DAVID WHEELER, WORLD BANK POLICY RESEARCH DEPARTMENT, ENVIRONMENT,
INFRASTRUCTURE, AND AGRICULTURE DIVISION, CITIZEN COMPLAINTS AS ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATORS (1997)
(concluding that a strategy in China of relying in part on complaints from citizens "undoubtedly provides some
useful monitoring information, and an important avenue for community participation in environmental policy.
However, it also directs a major share of China's inspection resources toward areas where individuals or
communities have a high propensity to complain." They conclude that "[i]f regulators respond passively to
complaints, aggressive plaintiffs may capture most of the available resources.... Our results imply that
technical risk assessments should have priority status in determining agency resource allocation."). Id. at 15. Cf
Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice": the Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection,
87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787 (1993).
128. See, e.g., JOHNSON & BEAULIEU, supra note 3, at 166 (suggesting that "one of the CEC's most useful
functions will be to cast the spotlight on public authorities that fail to fulfill their obligations - in particular, the
obligation to effectively enforce domestic environmental laws"). Johnson and Beaulieu also urge that "there is
essential value in independent verification of information supplied by the member states and their national
bureaucracies." Id. at 138. See also IRC Report, supra note 6, at 5 (noting that the process makes it possible for
"some 350 million pairs of eyes to alert the Council of any 'race to the bottom' through lax environmental
enforcement").
129. See Bugeda, supra note 2, at 1603 (characterizing the absence of a direct remedy as a "serious
shortcoming of the procedure"). The lack of sanctions has led one commentator to label the process a
"procedural dead end" because the ultimate action is issuance of a factual record. See Chamovitz 1994, supra
note 36, at 266.
130. For a discussion of sanctions in the international arena, see ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER
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and other creative approaches. ' 3' The nature of the Article 14 process may make
it a profitable topic for research concerning the relative effectiveness of different
policy tools. 132
A sixth issue involves the possible impacts of the process on environmental
protection. As noted above, 133 the Article 14 process focuses on the effectiveness
of enforcement practices, not on the effectiveness of environmental regimes writ
large. Yet, as also noted above, an important goal of the process appears to be the
enhancement of environmental protection through the enhancement of enforce-
ment. 134 At least one commentator has argued in several articles that there is a
possibility that the prospect of international scrutiny of domestic enforcement
practices may lead to a reduction in environmental protection. 135 Professor
CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995). See also
Harold K. Jacobson & Edith Brown Weiss, Assessing the Record and Designing Strategies to Engage
Countries, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 5, at 547 (noting that "[in some areas of international law, such
as trade law or national security, sanctions have been regarded as essential to achieving compliance.").
Professors Jacobson and Brown Weiss include an interesting discussion of strategies for strengthening
compliance in their book. See id. at 542-54. They group such strategies into three primary categories: (1)
sunshine methods, (2) positive incentives, and (3) coercive measures. See id. Professors Brown Weiss and
Jacobson suggest that "different mixes of strategies will work better in different circumstances." Id. at 542-43.
They also offer the important insight that contexts are dynamic and, as a result, "[wihat mix will be most
effective for a particular accord or country will likely change over time." Id. at 543. See also Daniel A. Farber,
Environmental Protection As a Learning Experience, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 791 (1994) (containing an insightful
discussion of the need to design strategies that are adaptable in recognition of such dynamism).
131. "Spotlighting" strategies are receiving increasing attention generally, much of it positive. See, e.g., IRC
Report, supra note 6; Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and the Informational Standing: Akins and
Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 613, 616-17 (1999) (noting that "informational regulation, or regulation
through disclosure, has become one of the most striking developments in the last generation of American law;"
that disclosure of information "has become a central part of the American regulatory state - as central, in its
way, as command-and-control regulation and economic incentives;" and applauding this development,
concluding that informational strategies "have significant advantages" over command-and-control approaches,
though noting that the former are not appropriate in all contexts); Tom Tietenberg & David Wheeler,
Empowering the Community: Information Strategies for Pollution Control (1998) (visited Apr. 18, 2000)
<http://www.worldbank.org/nipr/workpaper/ecoenv/index.htm> (labeling such strategies as the "third wave"
of pollution control policy and concluding that such strategies are "effective in improving environmental
results"); Markell, supra note 3, at 99-108.
132. The unusual nature of this policy tool obviously lends itself to research in far more ways than those
described in the text. As one commentator has observed, the process "appears unique in its attention to
international scrutiny of the implementation of domestic [environmental] rules." Raustiala 1996, supra note 4,
at 725 n.15; see also Bugeda, supra note 2, at 1603 (indicating that "[t]here is common agreement that it
represents a critical advance for the involvement of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the North
American environmental dialogue"); Gal-Or, supra note 2, at 56. Several other mechanisms exist for NGO
involvement in international fora. See, e.g., Wirth 1994, supra note 2; Raustiala 1997, supra note 5, at 549
(noting that the NAAEC is certainly not unique in incorporating NGO's in an international legal regime but
asserting that the NAAEC "goes further than most multilateral treaties in terms of NGO access and
participation," in part because it provides for citizen submissions).
133. See NAAEC, supra note 2, art. 14.
134. See id. art. 1.
135. See Kal Raustiala, The Political Implications of the Enforcement Provisions of the NAFTA Environmen-
tal Side Agreement: The CEC as a Model for Future Accords, 25 ENVTL. L. 31, 50-54 (1995) [hereinafter
Raustiala 1995]; Raustiala 1996, supra note 4, at 760-62 (suggesting the impossibility of separating lawmaking
from enforcement and indicating that many laws are intended to be regularly unenforced).
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Raustiala suggests that such scrutiny may lessen the substantive scope of
environmental legislation in the United States, particularly because of the
technology-forcing and agency-forcing nature of some laws. 136 The argument is
that scrutinizing enforcement will lead countries to want to "look better" on that
front and that one strategy they may follow is to lower standards in order to
improve compliance rates. Future Commission actions on submissions may
provide information that is useful in examining the validity of this hypothesis.
The final issue I raise relating to the question of "effectiveness" involves the
impact of the process on "civil society." 137 A number of commentators have
applauded the potential emergence of a "global civil society."' 38 The Article 14
process is cited as a vehicle that may contribute to the development of such a
society. 139 There are a variety of issues of interest concerning the extent to which
the process is fulfilling its potential on this front and the reasons why it is (or is
not) doing so.540
I will close by listing three other categories of issues that are of importance.
First, there are issues relating to the behavior of national governments in
international regimes. Commentators have observed that the parties to the
Agreement have dual roles. They represent their national interests and also serve
as "custodians" of the Agreement. 14' The Article 14 process may offer interest-
ing insights into how Parties perform these multiple roles and into the types of
variables that may affect their behavior. 142 Second, and related, there is the issue
136. See Raustiala 1995, supra note 136.
137. "'Civil society' has been defined by one observer as the ensemble of non-state organizations and
relations that constitute associational life." Jesse C. Ribot, Representation and Accountability in Decentralized
Sahelian Forestry: Legal Instruments of Political-Administrative Control, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 447
(2000).
138. Raustiala 1997, supra note 5, at 573 (suggesting that "NGO activity within international environmental
law is therefore an important practical manifestation of global civil society").
139. IRC Report, supra note 6, at 18 (noting that the citizen submission process "provide[s] growing
recognition of the role of 'civil society' in international environmental governance"); Richardson, supra note
116, at 194 (indicating that "for the purpose of promoting the effective enforcement of environmental law, the
NAAEC allows for the citizens of the three countries to behave as though they are North American
environmental citizens").
140. See, e.g., Bugeda, supra note 2, at 1616-17 (asking about, for example, the extent to which "civil
society" thinks the process is worth the investment of time and resources needed to pursue submissions).
141. IRC Report, supra note 6, at viii (noting that "[t]he three Parties have dual roles within the CEC. On the
one hand, they act as individual nations in international organizations, each reflecting its own national interest.
On the other, the same representatives seek to identify and achieve goals of common interest. At times, the
transition from self-interested Party to joint Council member has been difficult."). See also Peter L. Lindseth,
Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative Character of Supranationalism: The Example of the European
Community, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 631 (1999) (raising the issue of the extent to which the Parties will cede
some measure of control to the Commission in noting that "[t]he identifying characteristic of the emerging legal
order is the formal role given to non-national decisionmakers in the elaboration and/or control of regulatory
norms that apply within national borders").
142. For example, the Independent Review Committee discusses briefly the impact that the number of
Parties to an Agreement may have on party behavior. See IRC Report, supra note 6. Another aspect of this issue
concerns the impact of a "spotlighting" procedure on the sustainability of the process and on party buy-in. See
discussion supra note 132.
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of the relationship between national governments and secretariats - the level of
autonomy/independence given to the latter, the evolution of such arrangements
over time, and the workability of such arrangements. 143 Finally, there is the
impact that international regimes can have on domestic politics.'44 This impact
may be felt in many contexts. For example, international regimes can impact
federalism - in the United States, they might impact the relationship between
the federal government and the states. 145 As the Article 14 process evolves,
careful study is likely to reveal interesting insights about each of these issues.1
46
In sum, the existing body of work about the Article 14 process contains
numerous useful insights. Researchers have the opportunity, however, to mine
many more nuggets of important insight through future work on the process. This
is a process of quite recent vintage. Further, the near term is likely to produce a
relatively substantial body of work. Finally, because of the relatively transparent
nature of the process, much of this work is likely to be quite easily accessible.
147
Those of us involved in the citizen submission process look forward to continu-
ing to implement it and to the insights of others interested in its operation.
143. See also Kirton, supra note 4, at 460; Block, supra note 36, at 412 (observing that "Articles 14 and 15
present a special challenge because of inherent tension between evaluating allegations against a Party under
these articles in our watchdog capacity and implementing consensus-based programs at the same time").
Related to this issue, as well as several of the others, is the significance of cultural and other differences among
the three parties, such as availability of resources and technical capacity.
144. See, e.g., Stephen Zamora, NAFTA and the Harmonization of Domestic Legal Systems: The Side Effects
of Free Trade, 12 ARiz. J. INTr'L & CoMP. L. 401 (1995).
145. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Panel III: International Law, Global Environmentalism, and the Future of
American Environmental Policy, 21 ECOL. L.Q. 485 (1994); DAVIES & MAZUREK, supra note 115, at 14 (noting
that "[i]nternational actions are increasingly likely to affect the directions and policies of EPA"); Science
Advisory Board, United States Environmental Protection Agency, Pub. No. EPA-SAB-EC-95-007, Beyond the
Horizon: Using Foresight to Protect the Environmental Future 17 (1995); Raustiala 1997, supra note 5, at
582-83. The Article 14 process, as noted above, is an international mechanism focused on domestic
environmental enforcement performance. See generally, Chamovitz NAFrA, supra note 7. Some commenta-
tors question the appropriateness of making domestic standards the targets for international review. See
Chamovitz 1994, supra note 36, at 278-99.
146. See, e.g., Zamora, supra note 144, at 405 (noting that "[t]he interplay between national laws and
international law is now a favorite topic of scholarly inquiry").
147. See CEC homepage, supra note 2. Most CEC documents are available for public access on the CEC
web page.
